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COMMENT
The Federalism Challenges of Impact Litigation by
State and Local Government Actors
In the October Term 2oo, the Ohio Attorney General's Office filed thirty-
six briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court,' thereby participating in more than a
third of that Term's cases. Of those, thirty-four were amicus briefs.2 While
striking, this high level of involvement by a state attorney general's office in
constitutional litigation to which the state is not a party is no longer an
aberration. Rather, it is part of a growing trend among state and local
government actors of taking a more active role in constitutional and Supreme
Court litigation.3 This Comment examines the important implications for
federalism of the increased prominence of these government attorneys in
constitutional litigation. More specifically, it illustrates a tension between the
adoption of an affirmative litigation model by state and local government
actors and the democracy-enhancing values fostered by federalism. The
Comment concludes by proposing some possible corrective measures.
The argument proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the recent rise to
prominence of a set of state and local government litigators- namely, state
attorneys general, state solicitors general, and city attorneys. Part II establishes
a federalism framework through which to evaluate the trend identified in Part
I, grouping the values advanced by federalism loosely into the diversity theory
and the self-governance theory. Under the diversity theory, the existence of
different state practices has two distinct virtues: it both fosters "state
laboratories" for the testing of innovative policy proposals and allows for the
1. David M. Gormley, State Solicitor: An Appellate Lawyer's Dream, iO OHIO ST. B. ASS'N SEC.
NEWSLETTER 9, 10 (2003).
2. Ohio filed a brief as a party only in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), and
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
3. See infra Part I.
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tailoring of policies to citizens' varying tastes and situations. Under the self-
governance theory, the importance of state and local government is preserved
in order to encourage democratic participation in governance by the citizenry.
Part III demonstrates the tension between some forms of affirmative
litigation undertaken by state and local attorneys and the values promoted by
federalism under these two theories. This examination will proceed through
two case studies. The first discusses the amicus brief filed by the Attorney
General of Texas, joined by twenty-nine other state attorneys general, in
District of Columbia v. Heller,4 the case reviewing the District of Columbia's
handgun ban. The second reviews the California Attorney General and San
Francisco City Attorney's recently filed suit to invalidate Proposition 8,5 the
ballot initiative that amended the state constitution of California to prohibit
gay and lesbian marriage. Each of these examples involves state action that this
Comment will argue conflicts with the purposes of federalism outlined in
Part II: Texas's amicus brief in Heller represents a use of state power to impose
uniformity on state laws that is in tension with the diversity theory, while the
San Francisco City Attorney's suit to invalidate a state ballot initiative is at
odds with the justifications for federalism put forth by the self-governance
theory.
Part IV briefly proposes some potential reforms. Rather than patterning
their offices after public interest law firms, this Comment proposes that state
actors embrace the model of federal prosecutors in order to avoid partisan
capture. First, they should establish a cadre of career appellate lawyers likely to
span several administrations. Second, they should impose upon themselves -
or state legislators should impose upon them-the discipline of primarily
accepting cases through agency referral.
I. THE INCREASED PROMINENCE OF STATE AND LOCAL ACTORS IN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Three classes of state and local government attorneys have assumed a
newly prominent role in affirmative constitutional litigation in recent years.
First, since the mid-197os, state attorneys general have filed increasing
numbers of amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court under the aegis of the
National Association of Attorneys General.6 Second, in the past ten years, a
4- 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
6. Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys General as Amicus
Curiae, 70 JUDICATURE 298 (1987).
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dozen states have established the office of state solicitor general,7 the occupant
of which is charged with state appeals in front of the Supreme Court and with
other critical appeals.8 Finally, a new generation of city attorneys, exemplified
by the San Francisco Office of the City Attorney, has become increasingly
involved in constitutional and Supreme Court litigation.9
Indeed, in recent years, states have appeared as amici in "more than a third
of the cases that the Supreme Court considers on the merits."" Concomitantly,
each of these institutions has begun to recruit top appellate legal talent in
increasing numbers," with many seeing it as "a new road to professional
advancement-and face time at the U.S. Supreme Court." 2
This newly prominent role for state actors did not arise spontaneously. In
the case of state attorneys general, for example, this increased interest in
constitutional and Supreme Court litigation resulted from a concerted effort on
the part of Chief Justice Warren Burger to increase the prowess of state
lawyering before the Court in the wake of a series of state defeats in federalism
cases to which he had dissented. 3 The position of state solicitor general, in
turn, has been created by attorneys general to "improve the quality of
advocacy" at the appellate level and to "promote the orderly development of
law."14
7. Peter Page, State Solicitor General Appointments Open Doors for Appellate Practitioners, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.bradleyarant.com/pdf/oo5o8o8ooo8Bradey.pdf. Indeed,
between 1987 and 2001, "the number of states with solicitors [grew] from eight to twenty-
four." James R. Layton, The Evolving Role of the State Solicitor: Toward the Federal Model?, 3 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 533, 534 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Attorney General of Texas, Office of Solicitor General (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/agency/solicitorgeneral.shtml (stating that the Texas Office of
Solicitor General was "[e]stablished in January 1999" to "handle[] those appeals
determined to be most significant to Texas and to the development of federal and state
jurisprudence").
9. See, e.g., Press Release, S.F. Office of the City Att'y, Herrera's U.S. Supreme Court Brief
Blasts Federal Abortion Ban as an 'Episode of Congressional Defiance' (Sept. 20, 20o6),
http://www.sfgov.org/site/cityattorney-page.asp?id=9 9 i6o (describing the San Francisco
City Attorney's role as intervenor-respondent in a challenge to the congressional Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act in the Supreme Court).
io.. Layton, supra note 7, at 552.
11. See, e.g., Page, supra note 7.
12. Tony Mauro, Stating Their Case, AM. LAw., Aug. 18, 2003, at 63, 63, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp ?id=io 59 9 8o 4 7 2625 .
13. Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIz. L. REV. 709,
752 (20o8). The first of these defeats was Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
14. Layton, supra note 7, at 542, 552.
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II. TWO THEORIES OF FEDERALISM
Under most theories of federalism, the existence of strong state actors is a
prerequisite to the health of the federal system.'" This Comment argues,
however, that state actors can undermine the "distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local"' 6 as surely as can federal actors, with serious
repercussions for the values promoted by the federal system.
There are many justifications for federalism.' 7 The most common can be
grouped loosely into what this Comment will call the diversity theory and the
self-governance theory. As Part III explains, the current model of litigation
undertaken by state and local governmental actors has the potential to come
into conflict with federalism norms under both theories.
Under the diversity theory, federalism's central benefit is in allowing a
thousand flowers to bloom. In areas where there is no unified federal policy or
legislation, states in a federal system are free to legislate and make policy
independently. This state freedom has the virtue of allowing creative policy
proposals to be tested. In Justice Brandeis's words, "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."" Further, state freedom allows policies
to be tailored to the individual preferences and situations of citizens in different
locales. "[L]ocal laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while
15. This is true of those theories championing states rights that stress the degree to which
"Congress' authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution." United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 61o (2000). Alexander Aleinikoff and Robert Cover's
"dialectical federalism," under which federalism's value derives from the dynamic
interactions between state and federal actors, also takes this view. Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035
(1977).
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
17. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 107-40 (1995); Heather K. Gerken & Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) ("As with many vaguely
defined constitutional mandates, we need a set of mediating principles to translate 'Our
Federalism' into manageable legal doctrine.").
18. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he 50 States serve as laboratories for the
development of new social, economic, and political ideas."); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of
Federalism: "Converse-1983 in Context," 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229,1233-36 (1994) (describing the
"laboratory" theory, under which states are "[e]xperimenters" and "[e]ducators").
156o
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a national government must take a uniform-and hence less desirable-
approach.""
Under the self-governance theory, federalism is lauded for encouraging
democratic participation in governance through the existence and growth of
strong state political institutions. This view is best expressed by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in FERC v. Mississippi: "In addition to
promoting experimentation, federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens
to participate in representative government .... If we want to preserve the
ability of citizens to learn democratic processes through participation in local
government, citizens must retain the power to govern, not merely administer,
their local problems."2" Endorsing this view, Akhil Amar describes state and
local government as "offer[ing] citizens clinical seminars in democratic self-
government."2 On this account, federalism's virtue is in allowing greater
citizen participation than would a single centralized government.
III.IN TENSION WITH THE AIMS OF FEDERALISM: TWO CASE
STUDIES
As the following case studies demonstrate, aggressive affirmative
litigation undertaken by state and local governmental actors has the potential
to come into conflict with the justifications of both the diversity theory and the
self-governance theory. To elucidate this point, this Comment focuses on
Texas's participation in the District of Columbia v. Heller and the California
Attorney General and San Francisco City Attorney's response to the passage of
Proposition 8.
A. States as Amici Curiae in District of Columbia v. Heller
In 2008, the Supreme Court established that the Second Amendment
endows citizens with an individual right to bear arms.2 It was aided in its
analysis by an amicus brief filed by the Attorney General and Solicitor General
19. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484,
1493 (1987) (reviewing RAUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)).
20. 456 U.S. at 789-90 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
21. Amar, supra note 18, at 1234.
22. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (20o8).
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of Texas on behalf of thirty states,23 arguing that the District of Columbia's
"firearms regulations are unconstitutional." While the amici's requisite
statement of interest focused most heavily on potential abridgement of their
own citizens' Second Amendment rights,2" the states' actual interest was to
bring other states into conformity with their own practices-an aim in direct
conflict with the diversity theory of federalism.
The amici's statement represented their interest in the case to be its
"potential impact on their citizens' [Second Amendment] constitutional
rights. ",, 6 The states continued, "The individual right to keep and bear arms is
protected by the United States Constitution and the constitutions of forty-four
States. Given the significance of this fundamental right, the States have a
substantial interest in ensuring that the Second Amendment is accorded its
proper scope." 7 The implication is that the states do not wish to be forced to
abridge or narrow the right to bear arms enshrined in their constitutions. This
argument, however, lacks force; states are in no way forbidden from granting
their citizens a right more expansive than the right granted to them by the
federal government." Even if Heller had held that the federal government
grants only a collective right to bear arms, that holding would merely have
affirmed the federal government's power to impose regulations on territories
under its control, like the District of Columbia and Guam.29 As a matter falling
under the state's police power, Texans' individual right to bear arms would still
be firmly entrenched in their state constitution."
23. Brief of the States of Texas et al.. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783 (No. 07-920) [hereinafter Heller Brief of the States].
24. Id. at iii.
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id.
27. id.
28. In the eminent domain context, for example, see National Conference of State Legislatures,
Eminent Domain 2006 State Legislation (Nov. 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
natres/emindomainlego6.htm (describing the passage of legislation in twenty-eight states
circumscribing the government's ability to exercise its eminent domain power in the wake of
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
29. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Locked Liberties, LEGAL TIMES, July 28, 20o8, at 42, 43 ("Heller applies
only to the District of Columbia and other territories controlled by the federal
government."). Even a potential companion case incorporating a narrow reading of the
Second Amendment against the states would only permit Texas and other states to regulate
firearms, not force them to do so.
30. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that federal regulation of
guns in a school zone under the Commerce Clause would give Congress "a general police
power of the sort retained by the States"). Indeed, the majority's reasoning in Lopez is broad
1562
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The real motive behind the states' filing of an amicus brief followed:
The amici States believe that the court of appeals's decision -that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
arms-is correct and fully consistent with the Framers' intent.
Moreover, the District of Columbia's categorical gun ban is markedly
out of step with the judgment of the legislatures of the fifty States, all
of which protect the right of private citizens to own handguns.3
That is, the states in question-largely Western and Southern states32-
disagreed with the interpretation of the Second Amendment underlying the
District of Columbia's law both as a matter of constitutional interpretation and
of policy. To prevent the District's erroneous interpretation from being
codified by the Court and given force to allow other states to regulate firearms,
the states filed an amicus brief to try to influence the Court's outcome.
The states' desire to see their interpretation of the Second Amendment
adopted by the Court and to strike down firearm regulations in other states
should give us pause. Indeed, the first of those desires highlights the potential
problem of capture by a special interest group.33 While there is no evidence that
such capture occurred here, it would generally be possible for an interest
group, having installed one of its members as state solicitor general, to use that
enough to dispel any theory that the Texas amicus filing stemmed from worries about
potential preemption of Texas firearm regulation as a result of an adverse decision in Heller.
The Lopez majority criticized the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199o, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(2000), for being "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce,"'
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, noting that "[u]nder our federal system, the 'States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law,"' id. at 561 n.3. (quoting Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). The Court then criticized the statute for
"displac[ing] state policy choices in ... that its prohibitions apply even in States that have
chosen not to outlaw the conduct in question." Id. Such reasoning would apply a fortiori in
cases where a state had explicitly protected the right to bear arms and federal preemption of
the police power was also at issue.
31. Heller Brief of the States, supra note 23, at 1.
32. Id.
33. This idea of capture by a special interest group should be distinguished from "capture" by a
political party or governing majority. As elected officials, state attorneys general are
intrinsically political; it is a feature, rather than a bug, that the Texas Attorney General is
generally a Republican and that the New York Attorney General is generally a Democrat. In
such cases, the political actions of these actors have a certain democratic legitimacy. This is
different in kind, however, from the potential capture of the office by an Attorney General
acting as an agent of, say, the National Rifle Association or NARAL Pro-Choice America,
who did not gain office as a result -or at least, not wholly as a result- of his affiliation with
such a group.
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position to circumvent normal rules and understandings governing the filing of
amicus briefs. Unlike private parties, states are granted automatic leave to file
amicus briefs in any case before the Supreme Court by the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.34 While the Rules are rarely an obstruction to the filing of
an amicus brief- most sophisticated parties grant blanket consent to anyone
wishing to file an amicus brief- their purpose is to ensure that only those
whose interests are genuinely at stake participate in litigation.3" Capture of the
office of state solicitor general or state attorney general could allow for
automatic filing of amicus briefs by ideological parties whose briefs might
otherwise be screened out by the parties. More seriously, it would allow
interest groups to throw the full weight of their state's name behind a brief
written to advance their ideological agenda.
With respect to the second desire -seeking to strike down the District of
Columbia's gun ban-the tension with the diversity theory is clear. The states
were concerned not with their own regulations, but with the regulations of
other states and territories, which they sought to bring into conformity with
their own regulations. The freedom granted to the states by the federal system
was thus used to undermine a benefit of the federal system, which depends on
a diversity of policies and regulations.
B. The San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara County Challenge to
Proposition 8
In 2008, the California Supreme Court struck down state laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples as a violation of the state's constitution? 6 In
response, Californians voted later that year to ratify Proposition 8, overturning
the decision of the Supreme Court and amending the state constitution 7 so
that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California. 38
34. FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) ("The United States or an officer or agency thereof, or by a State,
Territory or Commonwealth may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the
parties or leave of court. Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if
the brief states that the parties have consented to its filing.").
35. See FED. R. APP. P. 29 advisory committee's note (Committee Notes on Rules-1998
Amendment).
36. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
37. CAL. SEC. OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL
ELECTION 62 (2008) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE], available at
http ://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2oo8general/sov-complete.pdf.
38. CAL. CONST. art. I, S 7.5.
1564
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On November 5, 20o8-the very next day-the City Attorneys of San
Francisco and Los Angeles, as well as the Santa Clara County Counsel, filed a
suit "for a writ of mandate with the California Supreme Court to invalidate
Proposition 8,"'9 arguing that the proposed change to the Constitution would
"devastate[] the principle of equal protection."40 They were joined a week later
by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 41 then by several other
counties and cities,42 and eventually by the Attorney General of California.4 3
The Supreme Court of California consolidated their case with those filed on
behalf of three gay and lesbian couples by the American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Lambda Legal.'
As of the writing of this Comment, the outcome of the suit is uncertain. 41
Regardless of the outcome, however, the suit's filing comes into tension with
federalism's self-governance values in three ways. First, the suit seeks to use
courts to undo the results of a democratic process that was, by all accounts,
healthy -that is, a process that did not involve significant allegations of voter
fraud, drew large numbers of voters, and involved high rates of political
39. Press Release, Office of the S.F. City Att'y, Herrera Joined by Los Angeles, Santa Clara
Counterparts in Suing To Invalidate Prop. 8 (Nov. 5, 20o8),
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/prop8lio6.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Molly Hennessey-Fiske, Emotional Board of Supervisors Backs Prop 8. Challenge, L.A. Now,
Nov. 12, 2008, http ://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2oo8/ii/the-los-angeles.htnl.
42. These parties include the counties of Alameda, Marin, San Mateo, and Santa Cruz, as well as
the cities of Fremont, Laguna Beach, Oakland, San Diego, Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, and
Sebastopol. Answer to Second Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate; Return to Order to
Show Cause, City & County of S.F. v. Horton, No. S168o78 (Cal. Dec. 19, 20o8), available at
http ://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/s168078-answer-
amend-petition.pdf.
43. Justin Ewers, California Attorney General Jerry Brown Asks Court To Overturn Prop 8, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 20o8, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
politics/2o08/12/22/califomia-attorney-general-jerry-brown-asks-court-to-overturn-prop-
8.html.
44. Maura Dolan & Tami Abdollah, Gay Rights Supporters File 3 Lawsuits Against Prop 8, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A23.
4S. Oral argument was heard March 5, 2009. See Press Release, Judicial Council of Cal.,
Supreme Court To Hear Oral Argument in Prop. 8 Cases on March 5, 2009 (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NRo8-o9.pdf. An opinion is due to
be rendered within ninety days of oral argument. California Courts, Proposition 8 Cases,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/prop8.htm#newsreleases (last
visited May 2, 2009).
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participation in the form of activism and campaigning on both sides. a6 Second,
it seeks to move the sphere of debate about a fundamental issue from the level
of the political to the level of the legal -that is, it encourages citizens to debate
publicly not the important question of the nature of marriage, but rather the
more technical and workmanlike question of the interaction between the state
constitution's equal protection clause and the constitutional amendment
process. It is these questions -and not questions about morality, politics, and
their intersection - that will yield legal fruit. Finally, it moves the locus of
decisionmaking from 13.7 million Californians 47 to the cadre of government
and public interest lawyers representing each side.
Both of these aspects of the city attorneys' impact litigation strategy put
them in tension with the self-governance theory of federalism. The creation
and passage of a ballot initiative to amend the state constitution is a
quintessential act of democratic self-governance at the state level. 48 For state
actors to use affirmative litigation to attack a ballot initiative undermines
democratic self-governance by replacing the democratic will of the people with
the judgment of a small set of government actors.4 9 Thus, such affirmative
litigation uses state actors' sphere of freedom to undermine the states' role as
democratic seminars. Moreover, it has the potential to undermine the ballot
46. Lisa Leff, California Voters Approve Gay-Marriage Ban, ABC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=6j85755.
47. Statement of Vote, supra note 37.
48. Ballot initiatives, of course, have come under criticism as being subject to manipulation. For
a vivid account, see Arthur Lupia, Dumber than Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy
Voters, in DANGERous DEMOCRACY? THE BATrLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66
(Larry J. Sabato, Howard R. Ernst & Bruce A. Larson eds., 2001); see also K.K. DuVivier,
Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 7o ALB. L. REv. 1045, 1048-49 (2007) (citing
ballot initiatives as "susceptible to lobbyist influence," stating that "[m]oney may also play
at least as corrosive a role in initiative campaigns as it does in representative elections," and
emphasizing that "[p]artisan politics also have become a part of the initiative experience").
Nonetheless, neither the democratic status of the ballot initiative nor its effect on
participation is disputed. Rather, "[r]esearch shows that initiative propositions increase
turnout." DuVivier, supra, at 1049. Indeed, "forty-nine of the fifty states [now] require that
amendments to [their] constitutions be submitted to a statewide vote." New Progressive
Party v. Colon, 779 F. Supp. 646, 659 (D.P.R. 1991). The initiative has been approvingly
called the "most democratic of procedures." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. This is not to deny the important role affirmative litigation plays in policing the procedural
legitimacy of ballot measures. Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
(arguing for the importance of judges in enforcing procedural rights). Nor is it to say that
democratic self-governance is the highest good. In many situations, other higher values
should unquestionably be advanced - potentially through affirmative litigation - at the cost
of some degree of democratic self-governance.
1566
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initiative system more broadly. Citizens contemplating the massive efforts
necessary to pass a successful ballot initiative may well refrain from future
initiatives that a small group of powerful government lawyers has the power to
overturn.
IV. CONFORMING LITIGATION BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ACTORS TO FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES: THE FEDERAL
PROSECUTOR MODEL
Many-if not most-offices of state solicitors general model themselves
explicitly on their federal counterpart, the Office of the U.S. Solicitor
General. 0 In addition, there are many similarities between state attorneys
general, solicitors general, and city attorneys and their federal counterparts in
the Department of Justice (DOJ). For example, state attorneys general, like
prosecutors, enjoy a broad range of discretion in investigating and charging
crimes." Like prosecutors, whose client is justice, the primary role of state
attorneys general is "to represent the public interest and not simply 'the
machinery of government.'"s.
Despite their resemblance to DOJ attorneys, however, the state and local
government attorneys' litigation strategies and focus differ markedly from the
federal government attorneys to whom they are analogous. The Civil Rights
Bureau in the Office of the New York State Attorney General, for example,
"conducts affirmative litigation, investigations, and policy initiatives in the
areas of reproductive rights, disability rights, police misconduct, and
discrimination in employment, mortgage lending, housing, public
accommodations, and other sectors." 3 In addition, the Bureau
50. See, e.g., Attorney General of Texas, supra note 8 ("[T] he Texas OSG is expressly modeled
after the Office of the Solicitor General at the U.S. Department of Justice.").
51. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons
from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006) ("Many state attorneys general
have significant authority to investigate both governmental and non-governmental
misconduct. Attorneys general also play an important role in criminal law enforcement, with
some state offices having direct prosecutorial powers or supervisory authority over law
enforcement officers.").
52. Id. at 2456.
53. Symposium, A Conversation on Federalism and the States: The Balancing Act of Devolution, 64
AiL. L. REv. 1091, 1127 (2001) (detailing a biography of Civil Rights Bureau Chief Andrew
G. Celli, Jr.).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
employs an 'impact litigation' model to court cases, drafts and
proposes civil rights-related legislation for consideration by the State
Legislature, releases reports, and facilitates educational seminars on
civil rights controversies around the state ... [and] assists the New
York State Solicitor General in the preparation and submission of
amicus briefs in civil rights cases of interest to the State. 4
In short, many of these state and local government actors have adopted the
model of public interest law firms in conducting impact litigation and
submitting amicus briefs to the Supreme Court with an eye toward changing
the course of law. 5
By contrast, many sections of the DOJ commence affirmative civil actions -
usually in the form of civil prosecutions and enforcement actions -only at the
behest of an executive agency. 6 Even the U.S. Solicitor General, who among
all government advocates has the strongest claim to be charged with
independently interpreting the Constitution- or, rather, interpreting the
Constitution in accordance with the executive branch's views, as opposed to
the judicial branch's viewsST-has "rarely challenged Supreme Court
precedent," focusing instead on defending government policies by reference to
existing precedent s8
Adopting a DOJ-like model of litigation would help state and local
government attorneys to better serve federalism values that are sometimes
slighted by the pursuit of impact and affirmative litigation. This can be
accomplished in two ways: first, through institutional changes designed to
54. Id.
55. The federalism implications of adopting this affirmative litigation model are only troubling,
however, in the context of litigation in federal courts or on federal questions. That some
states choose to employ a state solicitor with an active agenda of impact litigation on the
purely state level - without any federal externalities - is merely an example of the diversity of
governance and policing practices chosen by different states.
56. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 5-12-111(a) (1997) (noting that,
in the environmental context, "as a matter of policy and practice, civil prosecutions are
initiated at the request of' the relevant agency head); see also Neal Devins & Michael Herz,
The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, s U. PA. J. CONST. L.
558, 562 (2003) ("In [civil actions], DOJ will not proceed without a client .... Indeed, the
most plausible reading of the statutes is that DOJ could not proceed in a civil case without the
agency even if it wanted to.").
57. See John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional
and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 804-o6 (1992) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED,
ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION -A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991)).
58. Id. at 807.
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depoliticize office culture, and second, through self-imposed or statutory
procedural requirements about the cases in which state and local attorneys can
become involved.
The first of these suggestions - changes in institutional culture - can be
achieved in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most promising of these is the
establishment of a cadre of civil servants to work as assistants to the state
attorney general and state solicitor general. The U.S. Solicitor General draws
institutional support, continuity, and stability from the career appellate lawyers
in his office."9 For example, the deputies in the U.S. Solicitor General's Office
are apportioned between political deputies, who are appointed, and career
deputies, who rise through the ranks of the civil service.6" State solicitors
general, on the other hand, have generally lacked this resource.6 The
development of career deputies and assistants in the offices of state solicitors
general and state attorneys general would allow attorneys spanning several
administrations to act as a nonpartisan anchor in those offices, catalyzing a
change in institutional culture.
Second, there may be room for reform extending beyond the cultural to the
legal. State solicitors general differ from their federal counterparts in that
many of the cases in which the state solicitors are filing briefs are cases
in which no single state agency has a particular interest. These are
cases in which the state would not be likely to participate unless led by
a solicitor who takes an expansive view of both the law and her
responsibilities.62
Calling for state solicitors general to limit their dockets to those cases
referred by state agencies-or imposing that restriction statutorily-would
allow such actors to impose the self-discipline of limiting their own discretion.
If such self-cabining -which could, after all, require a state solicitor general to
excise many of the most interesting and consequential cases from his docket-
proved to be beyond the level of self-restraint reasonably to be expected of
appellate litigators, however, it could be imposed statutorily. Such a statutory
restriction could be positive or negative; given resource constraints, merely
5g. Layton, supra note 7, at 551.
6o. Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, "Tenured" Lawyers, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998,
at 83, 84.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 552.
1569
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
requiring state solicitors general to handle all agency appeals could crowd out
affirmative litigation.
Such decisions, however, would not be without cost; while imposing
restrictions on affirmative litigation by state actors could cure some federalism
ills, it could also strip these offices of the very cases that have attracted young,
talented attorneys to them. A talent-drain of this sort in state government
poses the risk of weakening the states' litigation power in the many cases where
legitimate state interests are unquestionably at stake. In light of this risk, any
steps taken to remedy the federalism problems engendered by overactivity on
the part of state and local attorneys would have to be taken gingerly, with
proper respect for the potential damage to the federal system that could be
incurred either through overactivity or underactivity on the part of state actors.
CONCLUSION
It is a truism that federalism requires a balance of power between state and
federal actors. Indeed, it has often been observed that imbalance in favor of a
too-powerful federal government signifies the weakness of the federal system.
On such an argument, national activity undertaken by state actors is taken ais a
sign of robust federalism.6 This Comment has sought to demonstrate a
complementary point: overactivity on the part of state and local actors, too, can
bespeak an unbalanced federalism. In the case studies reviewed, however, it is
not national power that suffers from overactive state and local actors, but
rather the values advanced by the localism of a federal system. That is, not just
federal actors, but state and local actors, too, can undermine the policy
experimentation and democratic participation promoted by a multiplicity of
local and state governments. To foster a healthy federalism, then, both state
actors as well as federal actors must learn-whether through cultural or
statutory change- to exercise restraint.
CLAIRE MCCUSKER
63. See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
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